More than three decades have passed since the United States and the US
SR opened negotiations to limit strategic arms. The process has produc
ed an Interim Agreement and six treaties: ABM, SALT II, INF, CFE, STAR
T I, and START II. At first glance, this appears lo be an arms control
triumph. A closer look, however, finds a near total disconnect betwee
n expectations and realities throughout the U.S.-USSR strategic arms c
ontrol process. As demonstrated in this article, factors external to t
he arms control process resulted in real progress in arms reduction. T
hese factors include: Soviet fears of U.S./NATO military advantages; t
he Soviet decision to raise their military burden in a vain attempt to
satisfy the demands of nuclear warfighting objectives; the economic a
nd political consequences of that perennial disaster known as socializ
ed agriculture: and the political ''dry rot'' of the entire Soviet emp
ire.