The human visual system allows a number of molar activities, among the
m straightforward seeing and reflective seeing. Both of these activiti
es include, as product and part of them, a stream of first-order, visu
al perceptual consciousness (experience, awareness) of the ecological
environment and of the perceiver himself or herself as inhabiting the
environment and acting or moving within it. The two respective compone
nt streams of first-order consciousness both proceed at certain brain
centers and, in Gibson's sense, they are resonatings to the stimulus e
nergy flux at the photoreceptors. But the two streams differ in that o
nly the one that proceeds during reflective seeing involves inner (sec
ond-order) consciousness of the component first-order, visual perceptu
al consciousness (experience, awareness). In this sense, perceptual co
nsciousness proceeds entirely nonconsciously during straightforward se
eing. This is because inner (second-order) consciousness is not a kind
of response to first-order consciousness, but is an intrinsic dimensi
on of the latter when it is proceeding consciously as opposed to nonco
nsciously. The content of first-order, visual perceptual consciousness
during reflective seeing is importantly different from the content du
ring straightforward seeing, notwithstanding their both being kinds of
seeing in the literal, nonmetaphorical sense as characterized by Gibs
on's ecological approach to visual perception.