REPRESSION AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTION - EAST-GERMANY IN 1989

A theoretical model is proposed explaining why repression sometimes de ters and sometimes instigates political action. Then this model is app lied to explain the mounting protests in East Germany in 1989. The bas ic idea of the model is that repression, as a cost, has a direct deter ring effect on political action, but that increasing repression instig ates positive incentives up to a certain point; then positive incentiv es decrease-a relationship corresponding to an inverted u-curve. Apart from repression, public goods incentives (discontent, weighted by per ceived political influence), moral incentives, and social incentives h ave positive effects on participation in protest. A representative sur vey of 1,300 citizens from Leipzig (East Germany) conducted in the fal l of 1990, focusing on the events of the East German revolution in 198 9, confirms the model with two exceptions: Increasing probability of r epression raises protest, but the increase becomes smaller with increa sing probability of repression (decreasing radicalization effect); inc reasing costs of repression lowers protest, but the decrease becomes s maller with increasing costs of repression (decreasing deterrence effe ct). It is argued that the protests in East Germany could emerge despi te severe repression because positive incentives to protest increased due to political events.