Sa. Banducci et Ja. Karp, ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF SCANDAL AND REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1992 HOUSE ELECTIONS, American politics quarterly, 22(1), 1994, pp. 3-26
The authors examine the electoral effects of political scandal and red
istricting, two conventional wisdom explanations for 1992's higher tha
n usual House turnover. They use the strategic politician theory as a
basis for their analysis to examine retirements, primary outcomes, and
general election outcomes. The theory assumes that politicians (both
incumbents and challengers) behave strategically and will run or not r
un based on the prevailing political climate. The authors find support
for the theory with regard to retirements; embattled incumbents are m
ore likely to retire. Their analysis of the primary and general electi
on outcomes, however, finds mixed support for the theory. Nevertheless
, the check scandal and redistricting had a direct impact on the incum
bent's vote margin, making the elections more competitive.