Although the governments of the member states of the European Communit
y (EC) have always had a principal role in fashioning EC policies and
norms, from the 1960s through the 1980s the European Court of Justice
played a key role in imposing a compliance regime with these norms tha
t has resembled in its structure and rigor the constitutional order of
a federal state. To an extent unprecedented in other international or
ganizations, states have found themselves locked into this regime and
unable to enjoy the more common international legal compliance latitud
e. Interestingly, member state courts, legislatures, and governments s
eemed, by and large, to accept the new constitutional regime ''imposed
'' by the European Court with a large measure of equanimity-a veritabl
e ''quiet revolution.'' In this essay, the author restates the princip
al features of the new order and then explores the possible reasons th
at explain the acceptance and endorsements of the European Court by ma
jor constituencies in the member states. In the conclusion, the author
hints at factors that bode a much rougher future relationship between
the European Court and its national interlocutors.