NORTH-KOREA - THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE

The present state of North Korea by any standard of measurement is a p eriod of transition. It is the transition not simply from Kim II Sung to his son Kim Jong-il, but from the old-guard partisans to the younge r generation of leaders. During the past five years from 1988 to 1993, North Korea has made many political changes in the domestic scene, ad justing itself to improve relations with South Korea. It has also amen ded its constitution to insure the survival of its own style of social ism. In the changed international scene North Korea witnessed the coll apse of its traditional allies and saw Russia and China lured away by South Korea. In an effort to adjust itself in the new world, it has jo ined the United Nations, tried to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, and opened a meaningful dialogue with the United States. In 199 2 it finally signed the Nuclear Safeguard Agreement and accepted the i nspections of the IAEA. To more hawkish North Korean leaders, however, all these conciliatory measures seem futile, and their efforts ended without any visible benefit. They withdrew from the Nuclear Nonprolife ration Treaty on March 12, 1993, and they seem to show definite signs of retreating from the new world beginning in September 1992. The Nort h Korean decision was not an abrupt decision by an impetuous young lea der fearing the revelation of its secret nuclear weapons program. Rath er, it was a decision based upon the culmination ot frustrations in de aling with South Korea, Japan, the United States, and the internationa l community during the past five years. It was also a decision emanati ng from political changes in North Korea, more specifically from the r ise of the militant and hawkish group to Support Kim Jong-il. Within t he foreseeable future, this conservative group of military persuasion will influence the course of North Korean politics. It is projected th at Kim Jong-il will be successful in assuming the leadership position after his father dies. The constitutional amendments of April 1992 tha t separated the role of the President and the role of the Supreme Comm ander of the Armed Forces may allow him to adopt a collective leadersh ip system, controlling the military and the party while assigning the administration of the government to a person whom he can replace at wi ll. There is little doubt that North Korea will develop nuclear weapon s, if it has not already done so. The growing political, economic, and military imbalance between North and South almost forces it to produc e nuclear weapons for security and for survival. The appropriate quest ion is not how to stop North Korea from going nuclear but how to deal with nuclear North Korea while it is still in the embryonic stage. The way to prevent North Korea from building a stockpile of nuclear weapo ns and deploying them is not to apply relentless pressure but to help solve their most urgent needs. The relationship between the North and South will be strained for some time to come, but it is hoped that Sou th Korea under its new civilian administration will not repeat the mis takes of its military predecessors.