ARMS-CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA - A SOUTH-KOREAN PERSPECTIVE

This article analyzes the conditions under which arms control and conf idence building can be accomplished between North and South Korea, and the major issues that will emerge in their negotiation. It places spe cial emphasis on the implications of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Given that the ''last glacier of the Cold War'' still remains, i n order for a Korean arms control process to get under way there shoul d be some degree of political confidence-building measures before Nort h and South attempt to negotiate military confidence-building and arms -control measures. Favorable political conditions will have to be pres ent for the Koreas to achieve substantive results in arms control nego tiation. So long as they are engaged in a deadly struggle for politica l legitimacy, they cannot share common interests or values. The intern ational environment is prompting North and South Korea to carry out su ch negotiation but North Korea's reluctance to make a genuine politica l reconciliation with the South is becoming the major obstacle. Faithf ul implementation of February 1992 Reconciliation Agreement and denucl earization declaration will pave the way to peace. Facilitating the no nproliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, essen tial to peace in Korea, will require both international and Korean pro cesses because it is bound to affect not only the peninsula but Northe ast Asia and the world. In the short run, linkage of American and Japa nese diplomatic normalization to North Korea's return to the NPT and a cceptance of IAEA's special inspections, along with China's skillful p ersuasion of Pyongyang to do so, will be the most effective means of d iscouraging North Korea's nuclear ambitions. In the long run the NPT r egime must be extended beyond 1995 and even strengthened. To correct m ilitary asymmetries in conventional forces, the two sides must underta ke transparency measures as the beginning of confidence building befor e making constraints and reductions in force deployment and structure. Progress will be slow because the North still sees arms control as an end for forcing the US to withdraw troops, whereas the South sees it as a means of reconciliation. The most realistic prospect for arms con trol in Korea will consist of a gradual political reconciliation, mult ilateral and bilateral non-proliferation of nuclear and ballistic weap ons, bilateral confidence-building and arms-control measures, and inte rnational support and guarantees. Above all, collective diplomacy need s to succeed in forcing Pyongyang to abandon the nuclear imperative an d choose the economic imperative as its means of survival and security , before the UN Security Council resorts to coercive diplomacy with se rious consequences.