A theory of ironic processes of mental control is proposed to account
for the intentional and counterintentional effects that result from ef
forts at self-control of mental states. The theory holds that an attem
pt to control the mind introduces 2 processes: (a) an operating proces
s that promotes the intended change by searching for mental contents c
onsistent with the intended state and (b) a monitoring process that te
sts whether the operating process is needed by searching for mental co
ntents inconsistent with the intended state. The operating process req
uires greater cognitive capacity and normally has more pronounced cogn
itive effects than the monitoring process, and the 2 working together
thus promote whatever degree of mental control is enjoyed. Under condi
tions that reduce capacity, however, the monitoring process may supers
ede the operating process and thus enhance the person's sensitivity to
mental contents that are the ironic opposite of those that are intend
ed.