SEPARATE SPHERES BARGAINING AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET

Citation
S. Lundberg et Ra. Pollak, SEPARATE SPHERES BARGAINING AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET, Journal of political economy, 101(6), 1993, pp. 988-1010
Citations number
38
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
00223808
Volume
101
Issue
6
Year of publication
1993
Pages
988 - 1010
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-3808(1993)101:6<988:SSBATM>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
This paper introduces the ''separate spheres'' bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models (e.g., Manser-Brown, McElroy-Horney) in that the th reat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marr iage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender role s. The predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce thre at bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer pay ments to the mother and payments to the father can-but need not-imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substanti ally altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.