RISK AND POWER USE - CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF COERCION IN EXCHANGE

I investigate how risk and fear of loss constrain the use of coercive power in nonnegotiated social exchange relations. An analysis of the u se of strategic power helps explain why exchange partners in previous research have rarely used coercive power even wizen their incentives a nd capacities to coerce were high. Using power is risky, and actors fe ar losses from the potential retaliation of their partners far more th an they value the prospect of increased rewards. The risks of coercive power use are especially great in the context of relations of mutual exchange because of the high reward dependence of actors who have the strongest incentive to use coercion. Two experiments show that when ri sk is reduced, particularly the risk of reward loss, both the use of c oercion and the effects of variations in the structure of coercive pow er increase.