The Korean military has gone through rapid changes in civilian-militar
y relationships over the past three decades. As society had greater op
portunities for education and has become more industrialized and urban
ized through successful economic development, the civilian sector has
been enhanced with a higher technological and administrative level tha
n the military. The military is no longer a sacred political power; it
has become instead a social institution and an occupation. This paper
examines how military manpower policy can meet these challenges. The
ROK military needs first, to build an integrated management system for
active, reserve and civilian working personnel as a total force, and
second, to establish a technology-intensive structure, switching from
the current manpower-intensive structure. To shift now to one in which
the professional soldiers and civilian working force perform a greate
r role than do the draftees: military personnel who are working at the
manpower Policy Division at the Ministry of National Defense and Head
quarters of the army, navy, and air force should stay at least five ye
ars; the proportion of mid- and long-term officers and sergeants to th
e total active manpower should be enlarged from the current 25% to 40%
, and the civilian working force should be increased from the current
30,000 perhaps to as much as 100,000; the composition ratio of the thr
ee branches of the armed forces (army, navy, air force) should be chan
ged from a proportion of 83:9:8 to 65:15:20, which means expanding the
technology-intensive navy and air force; more incentive systems such
as scholarships and bonuses should be introduced to gain the best qual
ity of mid- and long-term commissioned and non-commissioned officers f
rom the ROTC and OCS; the best qualified NCOs should be given an oppor
tunity to be promoted to officer rank; the education and training syst
em for commissioned officers should be renovated into a technology- an
d academic-oriented system; to establish job stability, the retirement
age of professional soldiers needs to be extended to the same level a
s that of government officials; and for a high-quality civilian force
the current dual procurement system needs to be integrated into one sy
stem such as that in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ROK military
will need to reform its current manpower policy organization so as to
perform a manpower planning function rather than just to continue in
its crisis management mode.