GAY RIGHTS, THICK AND THIN

In this article, Professor Massaro observes that constitutional bases for gay rights have rested primarily on ''thick'' doctrine-First Amend ment, privacy, and equal protection caselaw-in an effort to secure str ict scrutiny of antigay measures. Although attractive in some respects , these arguments pose significant risks of double-binds and boomerang s in the long run, even if they yield short-term legal victories. More over, ''thick'' arguments are sufficiently porous to support judges' c hilly responses to gay rights-responses that cannot be explained by in exorable doctrinal logic, but instead arise from hostility toward homo sexuality in particular, and ignorance about sexuality in general. Thu s, Professor Massaro argues for invoking ''thin'' doctrine-rational ba sis analysis-to expose these underlying factors. ''Thin'' doctrine dir ects judicial attention away from distracting doctrinal complexities a nd toward the central issue: ''What is wrong with homosexuality?'' Thi n doctrine answers this question by posing fewer risks of double-binds , avoiding attempts to define homosexuality, and requiring minimal rev ision of the existing doctrinal structure. Finally responses to this q uestion are framed by consulting emerging interdisciplinary work that grapples with the unreason of Bowers v. Hardwick. The recent decision of Evans v. Romer is an important illustration of how thin doctrine ca n succeed where more ornate legal theories fail.