DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA-SETTING IN THE EUROPEAN-COMMUNITY

The supranational institutions of the European Community (EC)-the EC C ommission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament- play a central role in EC governance, yet scholars remain divided on t he question of supranational autonomy and influence, with neofunctiona lists asserting, and intergovernmentalist denying, an independent caus al role for these institutions. The new institutionalism using rationa l choice theory may overcome this theoretical stalemate by examining t he functions that member state principals delegate to supranational ag ents, the autonomy of agents in carrying out their functions, and agen ts' ability to set the agenda for the member governments. The autonomy and influence of supranational institutions are a function of four fa ctors: the distribution of preferences among member state principals a nd their supranational agents, the institutional rules governing EC po licymaking, the information available to member governments and supran ational agents, and the ability of supranational institutions to build transnational constituencies within the member states.