THE VALUE OF CONTROL - EVIDENCE FROM FULL AND PARTIAL ACQUISITIONS INTHE REAL-ESTATE INDUSTRY

We investigate the differential wealth effects of (1) full and partial control acquisitions, (2) nonreal estate, real estate and REIT partic ipants, and (3) single- and multiple-bidder events. We find that targe t firms earn positive excess returns at the announcement of partial an d full acquisitions, but acquisitions that result in control earn larg er excess returns than noncontrol acquisitions. An examination of indu stry differences shows that real estate firms or REITs do not earn hig her returns relative to nonreal estate firms. Our analysis of market s tructure finds that bidders that are not involved in an acquisition pr ogram earn greater announcement period returns than prior acquirors. F or target firms, we find that those with a single offer earn higher re turns than those with subsequent offers. A cross-sectional regression analysis shows that while market structure is important in explaining returns, the main determining factor for target firms is the degree of control sought.