PUTTING WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN CONTEXT - WHY EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIONAL CHOICE NEEDS GREATER PROTECTION IN REFORM OF SECTION 8(A)(2)OF THE NLRA

Since the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, both labor law and indust rial relations have had to evolve in order to function effectively in an increasing global economy. Unions and employers have traditionally accepted limitations on ''company unionism'' as inherent to collective bargaining's adversarial context under section 8(a)(2) of the Nationa l Labor Relations Act (NLRA). However, recent congressional proposals such as the ''teamwork for managers and Employees Act'' (TEAM Act), wh ich advocate greater employer flexibility in developing ''Employee Inv olvement'' programs, have sparked vigorous debate regarding the limits imposed by section 8(a)(2). Management desires to initiate such progr ams to achieve better economic competitiveness; unions are skeptical o f these programs because they encroach upon worker control of the prod uction process. In this Article, Professor Nancy Kubasek argues that, in passing the Team Act, the House of Representatives supported manage ment's economic goals but overlooked the role played by adversarialism in industrial and labor relations. After analyzing this historical co ntext of labor-management adversarialism, Professor Kubasek concludes that NLRA revisions must provide greater worker protection than that o ffered by the team bill if the NLRA is to encourage employee involveme nt in the workplace of a global economy.