I argue that each function that is the topic of a main section of the
present article cannot proceed without inner (second-order) consciousn
ess. (a) The overt social action of your reporting to someone else tha
t you now have a toothache is one such function, which cannot occur, I
argue, unless you have inner (second-order) consciousness of your hav
ing the toothache; your simply having a toothache does not suffice, no
twithstanding its including first-order, pain-qualitative consciousnes
s of your tooth or part of your mouth. (b) And I argue that both your
report of seeing X and your report, due to your seeing X, of Xs presen
ce in the environment must be based on your inner (second-order) consc
iousness of seeing X; that is, in making such reports, you need to cho
ose which sentence to utter depending on what you have inner (second-o
rder) consciousness of seeing; again, simply (nonconsciously) seeing X
, though it includes a first-order, visual consciousness of X, does no
t suffice. (c) Also, your controlling your active locomotor behavior o
n a visual basis necessarily involves your having inner (second-order)
consciousness of how, as you move, a part of the environment is trans
forming or changing in how you are visually experiencing it, that is,
in how that part of the environment is visual-qualitatively appearing
to you; simply seeing the environment and where you are in it, simply
the first-order, visual consciousness involved in your seeing X, canno
t suffice.