P. Laskewitz et al., ORGANIZATIONAL MEDIATORS SIDING WITH OR AGAINST THE POWERFUL PARTY, Journal of applied social psychology, 24(2), 1994, pp. 176-188
Instead of being impartial, a mediator may side with one party as a fu
nction of the disputants' power differences, the mediator's legitimacy
judgments, or the disputants' capacity to sanction the mediator. Acco
rding to the power balancing theory, a mediator sides with the party t
hat has a power disadvantage vis-a-vis the other party. The theory on
siding postulates that the mediator sides with the party having more l
egitimate claims and/or more sanction capacity. A questionnaire study
showed that organizational mediators side with the less powerful rathe
r than the more powerful party, especially when this weaker party has
equal rather than less capacity to sanction the mediator. Thus, the te
ndency to balance power is moderated by the mediator's self-interest.
Additionally, mediators tend to favor the party they see as more legit
imate.