SMOKE SCREEN - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Authors
Citation
H. Dellas et V. Koubi, SMOKE SCREEN - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, Public choice, 78(3-4), 1994, pp. 351-358
Citations number
9
Categorie Soggetti
Economics,"Political Science
Journal title
ISSN journal
00485829
Volume
78
Issue
3-4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
351 - 358
Database
ISI
SICI code
0048-5829(1994)78:3-4<351:SS-ATF>2.0.ZU;2-G
Abstract
We develop a theory of smoke screening (ambiguity) as a means of maxim izing political support when the voters' evaluation of a candidate dep ends on the quality of information they receive, on their ability to o btain and process relevant information and finally on the candidate's popularity (goodness of reputation). We show that the more favorable a candidate's standing relative to his competence the greater the incen tive to milk good reputation by generating smoke screens; and that the more ''savvy'' (educated, knowledgeable, involved etc.) the public th e lower the amount of smoke screening activities undertaken.