Next generation commercial reactor designs emphasize enhanced safety b
y means of improved safety system reliability and performance. These o
bjectives are achieved via safety system simplification and reliance o
n immutable natural forces for system operation. Simulating the perfor
mance of these safety systems will be central to analytical safety eva
luation of advanced passive reactor designs. Yet, the characteristical
ly small driving forces of these safety systems pose challenging compu
tational problems to current thermal-hydraulic systems analysis codes.
Additionally, the safety systems generally interact closely with one
another, requiring accurate, integrated simulation of the nuclear stea
m supply system, engineered safeguards and containment. Furthermore, n
umerical safety analysis of these advanced passive reactor designs wil
l necessitate simulation of long-duration, slowly-developing transient
s compared with current reactor designs. The composite effects of smal
l computational inaccuracies on induced system interactions and pertur
bations over long periods may well lead to predicted results which are
significantly different than would otherwise be expected or might act
ually occur. Comparisons between the engineered safety features of com
peting U.S. advanced light water reactor designs and analogous present
day reactor designs arc examined relative to the adequacy of existing
thermal-hydraulic safety codes in predicting the mechanisms of passiv
e safety. Areas where existing codes may require modification, extensi
on or assessment relative to passive safety designs are identified. Co
nclusions concerning the applicability of these codes to advanced pass
ive light water reactor safety analysis are presented.