El. Glaeser et Hd. Kallal, THIN MARKETS, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, Journal of financial intermediation, 6(1), 1997, pp. 64-86
This paper tries to explain why the issuers of an asset would restrict
what information is available about their asset. In a world where kno
wledge is valued, market forces should induce disclosure, but we often
see markets (such as the market for mortgage-backed securities) where
assets' issuers refuse to release valuable information. We present a
model of market liquidity and find that market liquidity can both rise
and fall with the quantity of released information. More information
may increase asymmetries of information add ''lemons'' style breakdown
s. We find that asset bundling is more advantageous when private infor
mation is more accurate, which may be the case in the mortgage-backed
securities market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbe
rs: G14, G32. (C) 1997 Academic Press.