SENSIBLE BUYBACKS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT

Authors
Citation
E. Detragiache, SENSIBLE BUYBACKS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT, Journal of development economics, 43(2), 1994, pp. 317-333
Citations number
23
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
ISSN journal
03043878
Volume
43
Issue
2
Year of publication
1994
Pages
317 - 333
Database
ISI
SICI code
0304-3878(1994)43:2<317:SBOSD>2.0.ZU;2-2
Abstract
Sovereign debt is not prioritized, and creditors share the costs of a default in proportion to their exposure. Equal-sharing insures that al l creditors cooperate in imposing default sanctions, but it leads to e xcessive borrowing. Countries that borrowed too much because of equal- sharing can gain from debt buybacks, even if there is no debt overhang . Sensible buybacks should be accompanied by either an interest rate r eduction or a new money provision, they should grant unsold debt senio rity over new loans, and they should assign future debt renegotiation to a third party.