EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE-CONTROL - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY

Citation
Us. Dhillon et Gg. Ramirez, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE-CONTROL - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY, Journal of banking & finance, 18(1), 1994, pp. 9-26
Citations number
11
Categorie Soggetti
Business Finance",Economics
ISSN journal
03784266
Volume
18
Issue
1
Year of publication
1994
Pages
9 - 26
Database
ISI
SICI code
0378-4266(1994)18:1<9:ESOAC->2.0.ZU;2-F
Abstract
This study reexamines the wealth and corporate control effects of empl oyee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and finds that, the adoption of an ESOP is in general associated with positive wealth effects. However, t he Polaroid court ruling significantly changed the market's perception by enhancing the antitakeover role of ESOPs. A significant negative m arket response is found only after the court ruling. Analysis of specu lation and bid activity initiated after an ESOP adoption shows a signi ficant decline in takeover related activity following the court decisi on. Regression analysis corroborates this evidence. Consistent with St ulz [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 25-54] and Harris and Ra viv [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 55-86], the results also suggests a non-monotonic relationship between firm value and manageri al ownership. The results support the Scholes and Wolfson [Financial M anagement 49 (1990) 12-28] hypothesis that ESOPs are not primarily imp lemented for tax advantages.