We review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across cou
ntries in a simple multi-country world. We model explicitly (with the
model in Chichilnisky, 1993b) the fact that the atmosphere is a public
good. Within this framework we establish conditions for it to be nece
ssary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same i
n all countries. These conditions are quite restrictive, and amount to
either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating
within a framework within which lump-sum transfers can be made between
countries. These results have implications for the use of tradeable e
mission permits, which as normally advocated will lead to the equaliza
tion of marginal abatement costs across countries. The observation tha
t the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at
a Lindahl equilibrium rather than a Walrasian equilibrium in tradeable
permits.