In Afro-Asia, outside India, it may be that only in the Philippines is
the judicialization of politics a significant, current political deve
lopment. Several factors-liberal democracy, separation of powers, a po
litics of rights, interest group and opposition use of the courts, and
frequently ineffective majoritarian institutions with limited public
respect-make substantial judicialization of contemporary Philippine po
litics possible or even likely. The current Constitution assigns the j
udiciary new and expanded powers and responsibilities, giving it great
potential to judicialize policy processes that would otherwise be the
responsibility of majoritarian institutions. The constitutional grant
of authority given the Supreme Court provides a foundation for it to
substitute its judgment for that of any government official who has en
gaged in a ''grave abuse or discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.'' Activist judicial attitudes have led to Supreme Court
decisions that can be cited as evidence for a judicialization of post-
Marcos Philippine politics. (Decisions handed down by the Court during
1990-91 will be examined here for such evidence.) However, a developi
ng appointment pattern that places career judges on the Supreme Court
may reduce the likelihood of continuing judicialization, since, in the
Philippines, such appointees have been more likely to be restraintist
than have justices with different, more partisan, careers.