THE INDO-PAKISTANI ARMS COMPETITION - A DEDUCTIVE AND STATISTICAL-ANALYSIS

The author applies to South Asia a theory of armament that he develope d in the context of the superpowers' arms rivalry. The empirical findi ngs are consistent with the results for the superpowers' case: India a nd Pakistan are found to have matched high levels of armaments with lo w levels and vice versa. Such results are analytically similar to empi rical evidence on alliances showing that states, including India and P akistan, often ally with the stronger against the weaker side. In both cases the evidence contradicts conventional wisdom on power balancing , internal and external, respectively. The author's theory explains th is otherwise anomalous phenomenon: states use strength not just as an indicator of capability but also of intentions: given the same amount of hostile behavior, weak states appear more aggressive than strong on es. Hence, if states worry about intentions more than about power, the y would be attracted to stronger states precisely because of their str ength, not despite it.