ALLIANCE FORMATION AND GENERAL DETERRENCE - A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL AND THE CASE OF ISRAEL

This article studies the relationship between alliance formation and g eneral deterrence in regional rivalries. In a game-theoretic model und er complete information, an alliance is formed only when the potential ally would not intervene without one and would always intervene with one. General deterrence succeeds under complete information unless the potential attacker is stronger than the target and values the stakes highly, and the potential ally would never intervene. When incomplete information is added to the game, alliances are sometimes formed even when the potential ally's behavior would be unaffected by the alliance . Additionally, general deterrence under incomplete information someti mes fails because of the potential attacker's mistaken beliefs about t he probability that the target would win or the potential ally would i ntervene. The model is illustrated by examining the conflict between I srael and its rivals, Egypt and Syria, taking into account die role of the United States as Israel's potential ally. The combination of game theory arid empirical analysis is theoretically richer and empiricall y more informative than previous analyses of Israeli general deterrenc e and alliance behavior.