CONFLICT BETWEEN INTUITIVE AND RATIONAL PROCESSING - WHEN PEOPLE BEHAVE AGAINST THEIR BETTER JUDGMENT

When offered an opportunity to win $1 on every ''win'' trial in which they drew a red jelly bean, subjects frequently elected to draw from a bowl that contained a greater absolute number, but a smaller proporti on, of red beans (e.g., 7 in 100) than from a bowl with fewer red bean s but better odds (e.g., 1 in 10). Subjects reported that although the y knew, the probabilities were against them, they felt they had a bett er chance when there were more red beans. Similar, but less extreme re sults were obtained on ''lose'' trials, where drawing a red bean meant losing $ 1. These results were predicted from the concretive and expe riential principles of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Nonoptimal choices in the laboratory were significantly correlated with heuristic responses to relevant vignettes and with self-reported gambling in re al life.