This paper examines dynamics of state-business relations in the era of
trade liberalization in Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. It challenges the
orthodox view that replacing nontariff barriers (such as licenses and
quotas) with tariffs depoliticizes trade, reduces commercial rent-seek
ing activities, and creates a level playing field which will encourage
underground activities to surface, allowing the state to capture more
revenue. The paper illustrates that liberalization failed to suppress
commercial rent-seeking, helped to encourage the ascendancy of new po
litically connected merchant groups (the Mourides in Senegal and the L
ebanese in Cote d'Ivoire), and to some degree increased tax evasion le
ading to the farther erosion of state revenue flows. The cases show th
at trade-centered rentierism is rooted in structural features of these
West African economies.