As the title reveals, the author tries to sketch the main contribution
s of the realistic phenomenology to the new foundation of the classica
l realistic philosophy. In the present paper, he traces his own philos
ophical position as worked out in detail in his recently published pap
ers on the background of a critical dialogue with the idea of philosop
hy as pure science which was developed by the father of phenomenology
Edmund Husserl (esp. Husserl's Logos article Philosophie als strenge W
issenschaft). The author chooses some of the most important theses of
Husserl's article and examines them critically. Therefore Seifert rega
rds the answering of the above Kantian question as a significant, if n
ot revolutionary contribution of the realistic phenomenology to the fo
undation of a strictly scientifical philosophy. A carefully elaborated
datum of the substantial necessity as a true primordial fact accessib
le to our mind, of its ontological foundation, as well as of its accur
ate distinction from other essentially different kinds of necessity ma
kes it possible, according to Seifert, to get critically over the scep
ticism and relativism, both of them being immanent in the Kantian phil
osophy. At the same time, the foundation of the a priori cognition and
of the synthetical one in the objective and absolute substantial nece
ssity overcomes the more radical immanentism and subjectivism of the l
ater Husserl. Hence such a philosophy of substantial necessity and the
simultaneous rediscovery of the esse as real being represent a substa
ntial contribution of the realistic phenomenology to the new foundatio
n of the scientifical philosophy, a contribution that we owe to the re
alistic phenomenologists, namely Reinach and Hildebrand.