PHILOSOPHY AS AN EXACT SCIENCE

Authors
Citation
J. Seifert, PHILOSOPHY AS AN EXACT SCIENCE, Filozoficky casopis, 44(6), 1996, pp. 903-922
Citations number
18
Categorie Soggetti
Philosophy,Philosophy
Journal title
ISSN journal
00151831
Volume
44
Issue
6
Year of publication
1996
Pages
903 - 922
Database
ISI
SICI code
0015-1831(1996)44:6<903:PAAES>2.0.ZU;2-R
Abstract
As the title reveals, the author tries to sketch the main contribution s of the realistic phenomenology to the new foundation of the classica l realistic philosophy. In the present paper, he traces his own philos ophical position as worked out in detail in his recently published pap ers on the background of a critical dialogue with the idea of philosop hy as pure science which was developed by the father of phenomenology Edmund Husserl (esp. Husserl's Logos article Philosophie als strenge W issenschaft). The author chooses some of the most important theses of Husserl's article and examines them critically. Therefore Seifert rega rds the answering of the above Kantian question as a significant, if n ot revolutionary contribution of the realistic phenomenology to the fo undation of a strictly scientifical philosophy. A carefully elaborated datum of the substantial necessity as a true primordial fact accessib le to our mind, of its ontological foundation, as well as of its accur ate distinction from other essentially different kinds of necessity ma kes it possible, according to Seifert, to get critically over the scep ticism and relativism, both of them being immanent in the Kantian phil osophy. At the same time, the foundation of the a priori cognition and of the synthetical one in the objective and absolute substantial nece ssity overcomes the more radical immanentism and subjectivism of the l ater Husserl. Hence such a philosophy of substantial necessity and the simultaneous rediscovery of the esse as real being represent a substa ntial contribution of the realistic phenomenology to the new foundatio n of the scientifical philosophy, a contribution that we owe to the re alistic phenomenologists, namely Reinach and Hildebrand.