WHY MUST INFERIOR COURTS OBEY SUPERIOR COURT PRECEDENTS

The doctrine of hierarchical precedent is so deeply ingrained in judic ial practice and consciousness that its dominance has rarely been ques tioned, and, paradoxically, its validity has never been justified. In addressing that paradox, Professor Caminker undertakes a comprehensive inquiry into the constitutional and rationalist justifications for th e doctrine, outlining and assessing the various arguments supporting d iffering degrees of autonomy for the lower courts. He concludes that w hile the doctrine of hierarchical precedent is ultimately defensible, it is not as obviously defensible as the doctrine's strength would sug gest. Further, no one single rationale justifies the practice for all levels of the judiciary. A persuasive account must rely on a combinati on of constitutional and prudential arguments. Finally, Professor Cami nker argues that his account of the underpinnings of hierarchical prec edent helps resolve current controversies in constitutional law and ju risprudence, including whether existing Supreme Court decisions would still bind inferior federal or state courts if Congress stripped the S upreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over some cases, and whether ban kruptcy judges must obey federal district court precedents.