The control of goal-directed, instrumental actions by primary motivati
onal states, such as hunger and thirst, is mediated by two processes.
The first is engaged by the Pavlovian association between contextual o
r discriminative stimuli and the outcome or reinforcer presented durin
g instrumental training. Such stimuli exert a motivational influence o
n instrumental performance that depends upon the relevance of the asso
ciated outcome to the current motivational state of the agent. Moreove
r, the motivational effects of these stimuli operate in the absence of
prior experience with the outcome under the relevant motivational sta
te. The second, instrumental, process is mediated by knowledge of the
contingency between the action and its outcome and controls the value
assigned to this outcome. In contrast to the Pavlovian process, motiva
tional states do not influence the instrumental process directly; rath
er, the agent has to learn about the value of an outcome in a given mo
tivational state by exposure to it while in that state. This incentive
learning is similar in certain respects to the acquisition of ''cathe
xes'' envisaged by Tolman(1949a, 1949b).