In this paper I challenge the usual interpretations of Newton's and Le
ibniz's views on the nature of space and the relativity of motion. New
ton's 'relative space' is not a reference frame; and Leibniz did not r
egard space as defined with respect to actual enduring bodies. Newton
did not subscribe to the relativity of inertial motions; whereas Leibn
iz believed no body to be at rest, and Newton's absolute motion to be
a useful fiction. A more accurate rendering of the opposition between
them, I argue, leads to a wholly different understanding of Leibniz's
theory of space, one which is not susceptible to the objections Newton
had raised against Descartes regarding the representation of motion.
This in turn suggests a new approach for contemporary theory of space,
one which neither hypostatizes space nor tries to reduce it to relati
ons among actual things,