A REDISCOVERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In his recent book, Searle claims that more than anything else, the ne glect of consciousness is responsible for so much barrenness and steri lity in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. He prop oses to locate consciousness in the natural world by breaking with the materialist tradition now reigning in these fields of inquiry into mi nd and behavior. In Searle's view, consciousness is a physical, spatia l, biological, intrinsic feature of certain brain states and processes . However, he holds that consciousness is (a) a first-person, subjecti ve feature of conscious brain states and processes and (b) not possibl y identical to any of the third-person, objective features of consciou s brain states and processes, although (c) proximally caused by certai n of these third-person features. Searle argues, as well, that the men tality of nonconscious mental states and processes consists entirely i n their producing, barring interference, corresponding conscious brain states or processes. I examine Searle's ontological feature of subjec tivity, including how conscious brain states and processes are themsel ves objects of consciousness; why Searle holds that the first-person f eatures of conscious brain states and processes must be distinct from all third-person features; and Searle's claim that no nonconscious men tal state possesses intentionality since it is not conscious. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.