THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING

Analysts of the negotiation process claim that opportunities for integ rative bargaining are widely available. Accordingly they argue that ne gotiators should, as a matter of their own self-interest, redirect the ir commitments away from the tactics of hard bargaining and coward the tactics of cooperation, openness, and truthtelling. The author seeks to clarify both these claims. He demonstrates that the self-interest b eing invoked is an immediate pecuniary interest. He also shows that so me of the circumstances said to offer opportunities for integrative ba rgaining do not do so at all; that others do so only some of the time; and that still others do so in a way that is inherently unstable and offers nothing more than the opportunity to place a bet. Finally, he i dentifies important weaknesses in the second claim concerning the bene fits of cooperation, openness, and truthtelling. He concludes thar the full argument in favor of cooperation and truthtelling rests only in part on the possibility of integrative bargaining, but partly also on the negotiator's long-term pecuniary self-interest, on his nonpecuniar y self-interest, and on considerations of ethics.