CONGRESS, FOREIGN-POLICY, AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

New institutionalists argue that analysts are mistaken to separate pro cess from policy in studying Congress's role in policy making. Rather, Congress changes the structure and procedures of decision making in t he executive branch in order to influence the content of policy. Attem pts to substantiate this claim have examined procedural changes in dom estic affairs. This paper extends the argument by assessing the impact of five procedural changes in the area of defense and foreign policy: the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the le gislative veto on arms sales, legislative participation in trade negot iations, the conditions attached to U.S. security assistance, and the reporting requirements imposed on the intelligence community. The five case studies suggest that procedural changes do at times enable Congr ess to build its preferences into U.S. foreign policy, but the success es are partial rather than total. Procedural changes meet only partial success because of executive branch opposition and the cost of monito ring and punishing noncompliance. The findings point to the need to in corporate more sophisticated assumptions about Congress and the bureau cracy into future research.