NATURALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY - A QUESTION-ANSWERING APPROACH

Citation
Ra. Quinn et al., NATURALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY - A QUESTION-ANSWERING APPROACH, Journal of personality, 62(2), 1994, pp. 239-262
Citations number
67
Categorie Soggetti
Psychology, Social
Journal title
ISSN journal
00223506
Volume
62
Issue
2
Year of publication
1994
Pages
239 - 262
Database
ISI
SICI code
0022-3506(1994)62:2<239:NCOM-A>2.0.ZU;2-R
Abstract
Psychological research on morality has been based on researchers' defi nitions of morality or on philosophical theories. The present study ex amined naturally occurring conceptions of morality by using a knowledg e-structure methodology borrowed from cognitive psychology. Subjects g enerated statements in response to a question designed to expose gener ic knowledge about their concept of morality. Answer frequency and con ceptual clustering results suggested that a variety of diverse concept s undergirded subjects' moral thinking and revealed a person-based rat her than a philosophy-based pattern for commonly held conceptions of m orality. A three-dimensional scaling solution of the responses suggest ed that conceptions of morality were characterized by individual-socia l, general-specific, and absolute-relative distinctions. These finding s raise questions about assumptions underlying previous theories of mo rality. Moreover, the present methodology offers a basis for developin g a more representative account of moral thought that depends less on the beliefs of researchers.