We propose a model in which the physical and nominal dimensions of let
ter pairs are compared independently of whether subjects use physical
(shape task) or nominal (name task) identity as the decision criterion
. We attempt to explain the fast-same effect, the preponderance of fal
se-different errors, and the nominal-physical disparity as results of
congruent and incongruent outputs of physical and nominal comparison d
evices that function in both tasks. Subjects performed both tasks with
and without response deadlines. The stimuli were presented foveally o
r unilaterally to one or the other hemisphere. With foveal presentatio
ns, the nominal-physical disparity disappeared when congruent and inco
ngruent cells were compared, the fast-same effect occurred only in the
shape task, and there was a preponderance of false-different errors o
nly in the name task. Response times and error patterns from centrally
presented trials conformed to the predictions of the model. Performan
ce patterns from the lateralized trials conformed only partially. The
implications of the data are discussed in the context of several theor
etical models of same/different judgments.