Some argue the Iran-Contra investigations were inadequate, and that Co
ngress shirked its constitutional responsibilities to expose the affai
r. Others charge Congress expects ''another Watergate'' in every parti
san controversy. Neither claim establishes realistic expectations for
congressional foreign policy investigations. This argument establishes
a comparative framework for evaluating important Cold War investigati
ons. Three primary dimensions shape their nature, scope, and outcome.
Periods of ''emergency'' or stability in the international system affe
ct Congress's likely deference to the president. The institutional div
ision of foreign policy powers has cumulatively favored the expansion
of presidential power during the Cold War, and formidable presidential
advantages limit congressional investigations. Political culture tugs
in conflicting directions. American ''exceptionalism'' promotes the e
xpansion of presidential power, while liberal concerns for limiting st
ate power are expressed in efforts to reassert Congress's foreign poli
cy role. Because congressional assertiveness is a variable phenomenon,
the nature, scope, and purpose of its investigations will differ in e
ach case.