AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE POLICIES IN UNIFIE D GERMANY - COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND RESULTING POLICIES - THE CASE OF THE JOINT SCHEME FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE AND COAST PROTECTION
P. Mehl et M. Rudolph, AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE POLICIES IN UNIFIE D GERMANY - COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND RESULTING POLICIES - THE CASE OF THE JOINT SCHEME FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE AND COAST PROTECTION, Landbauforschung Volkenrode, 44(1), 1994, pp. 91-104
In the two decades before unfication of the two Germanies the ''Joint
Scheme for the Improvement of the Agricultural Structure and Coast Pro
tection'' (Joint Scheme) was characterized by long-term changes of its
policies. The political decision-making process in the joint committe
e of Federal and State goverments has been shaped by the rule that a m
ajority of three fourth of all votes is required. The resulting bargai
ning process for implementing new policies will provide no adequate so
lution to the problems which arise during the rapid changes in the agr
icultural sector of the new Federal states. From the present situation
, we can derive three main questitions which are discussed by this pap
er: Are present federal structures of decision-making flexible enough
to deal with the changing requirements? Which institutional innovation
s can be expected? How will agricultural structure policies, especiall
y farm investment subsidies and compensatory allowances in less favour
ed areas, be affected by changing structures of federal decision-makin
g? This paper starts from the following hypothesis based on the theory
of ''Politikverflechtung'' (political joint decision-making) and own
institutional and historical considerations: Although the group of par
ticipating actors has increased and the confrontation of interests has
been intensified, the Joint Scheme will continue to be the main instr
ument in German agricultural structure policies. To secure joint plann
ing and federal grants strategies of bargaining and conflict-reduction
will dominate the behaviour of the actors. Since the group of Federal
states with insufficient agricultural structures and small budgetary
resources is rather large, and because protection of their specific bu
dget against competitive pressure groups represents a common interest
of all participants, it seems unlikely that single participants will e
xit from the joint programme. Even the continuing process of European
integration will not decisivly change - as far as agricultural structu
re policy is concerned - the relationship between the three federal le
vels involved: the State and Federal goverments and the European Union
. As a consequence of the particular institutional framework, decision
-makers in German agricultural structure policies may extend the scope
of subsidies. In this case, one of the former intentions of the joint
Scheme - i.e. to plan and execute joint activities instead of only co
llecting separate programs - will no longer play any role. Above all,
Federal government could take the point of view that the Joint Scheme
may degenerate to a pure instrument for budgetary redistribution to th
e Federal states.