The present study investigated the social and relational bases of the
availability bias. The availability heuristic refers to the tendency t
o judge events to be more likely or frequent when instances thereof co
me more easily to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Tversky and Kahnema
n (1973) cite the example of a tendency to overestimate the risk of ro
ad accidents after witnessing an accident because of the availability
of such vivid information during judgment. We argue that the availabil
ity of information can be a function of the relevance of such informat
ion to the perceiver. Following self-categorization theory (Turner, Ho
gg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) we predicted that the self-relev
ance of target information would be enhanced where target and perceive
r share a common group membership or social identity, providing a basi
s for assumed similarity. This led to the hypothesis that availability
and judgments of risk would be greater when prior information about a
road accident implicated an ingroup rather than an outgroup, or than
when no information was provided. This hypothesis was tested in an exp
eriment which orthogonally manipulated both the social identity of phy
sics student subjects (''physicist' vs. 'scientist' identities were re
ndered salient) and stimulus information about the victims of a road a
ccident (physicists, psychologists, construction workers, no informati
on), such that the victims could either be defined as belonging to or
excluded from the ingroup. The hypothesis was strongly supported on a
number of indices of perceived risk. No significant differences obtain
ed between outgroup and no information conditions. These findings sugg
est that the effect of availability on judgments of risk was mediated
by the perceived relation of target stimuli to it.