INDIVIDUALISM AND MARRS COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF VISION

A great deal of philosophical work has addressed the question of wheth er Marr's computational theory of early vision is individualistic. Pur ge and Davies have argued that, according to Marr's theory, visual sta tes are individuated non-individualistically. Segal has denied that Ma rr's theory has these non-individualistic implications. More recently, Shapiro has argued that the entire debate has been misguided. I argue that Shapiro is mistaken in a fairly deep way, attention to which all ows us to raise and clarify several important issues involved in discu ssions of individualism. Contrary to Purge and Davies, and by a route rather different from Segal's, I defend the claim that Marr's theory o ffers no reason to think that visual states are individuated non-indiv idualistically.