Anthropocentrism can intelligibly be criticised as an ontological erro
r, but attempts to conceive of it as an ethical error are liable to co
nceptual and practical confusion. After noting the paradox that the de
arest instances of overcoming anthropocentrism involve precisely the s
ort of objectivating knowledge which many ecological critics see as it
self archetypically anthropocentric, the article presents the followin
g arguments: there are some ways in which anthropocentrism is not obje
ctionable; the defects associated with anthropocentrism in ethics are
better understood as instances of speciesism and human chauvinism; it
is unhelpful to call these defects anthropocentrism because there is a
n ineliminable element of anthropocentrism in any ethic at all; moreov
er, because the defects do not typically involve a concern with human
interests as such, the rhetoric of anti-anthropocentrism is counterpro
ductive in practice.