THE CASE FOR INTRINSIC THEORY .2. AN EXAMINATION OF A CONCEPTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS(4) AS INTRINSIC, NECESSARY, AND CONCOMITANT

The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of cheery of consciousness(4). Acc ording to such theory, a mental occurrence instance is conscious(4) (i .e., an immediate object of occurrent awareness) on ics own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a promine nt phenomenologist's argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consc iousness(4), and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all conscious(4) in h is view. Every objectivating act is a mental-occurrence instance that includes outer awareness, chat is, awareness of something lying (or se eming to lie) externally to the act. Every objectivating act presents an object distinct from itself conveys awareness of that object, and - allegedly as a mere by-product or concomitant - conveys awareness of itself. This article emphasizes the question of what property of outer awareness it is that necessarily, as has been claimed, brings along w ith it inner awareness of the respective objectivating act. Also, this article begins to argue that, in the very occurrence of any conscious (4) objectivating acr, inner awareness is ''interwoven'' with outer aw areness. Inner awareness is a part of the ''thematizing'' activity of any conscious(4) mental act, rather than being ''marginal,'' that is, a merely implicit concomitant of the act.