CRIMINALIZING WHITE-COLLAR MISCONDUCT - DETERMINANTS OF PROSECUTION IN SAVINGS-AND-LOAN FRAUD CASES

In this article we examine three explanations for the differential tre atment of white-collar offenders by the legal system: (1) an organizat ional advantage argument in which offenders in ''organizationally shie lded'' positions receive more lenient treatment, (2) an alternative sa nctions argument in which civil sanctions replace criminal sanctions i n the response to white-collar crime, and (3) a system capacity argume nt in which the legal response to white-collar crime is driven primari ly by resources and caseload pressures. These three theoretical argume nts are tested through an analysis of data on individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes against savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. We seek to determine the factors that influenced prosec utors to file criminal charges against some of these suspects and not others. We conclude that ail three models may be limited in their abil ity to explain low rates of prosecution in cases involving white-colla r crimes of the sort examined here, and suggest that these limitations may have to do with the circumscribed levels of analysis at which the se explanations have been pitched.