THE LOGIC OF 2-LEVEL GAMES WITH ENDOGENOUS DOMESTIC COALITIONS

This article attempts to formalize and extend Putnam's conjecture that greater domestic constraints can be a bargaining advantage in interna tional negotiations by means of a more realistic model of negotiator b ehavior. Unlike her counterpart in Putnam, the negotiator in my model has a direct interest, not coincident with those of her domestic const ituents, in the bargaining outcome. She also has more leeway in domest ic bargaining in that not all domestic constituents have veto power. T he results of the analysis show that the relationship between the nego tiator's domestic constraints and the bargaining outcome is more compl ex than Putnam's analysis suggests. The negotiator can be either bette r or worse off under greater domestic constraints. The conditions unde r which these different outcomes result depend on the distribution of political power between the negotiator and domestic constituents.