THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS EARLY DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD ASIA

Authors
Citation
Rd. Fisher, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATIONS EARLY DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD ASIA, The Korean journal of defense analysis, 6(1), 1994, pp. 103-135
Citations number
25
Categorie Soggetti
International Relations
ISSN journal
10163271
Volume
6
Issue
1
Year of publication
1994
Pages
103 - 135
Database
ISI
SICI code
1016-3271(1994)6:1<103:TCAEDP>2.0.ZU;2-#
Abstract
During the first year of the Clinton administration, American defense policy toward Asia was marked by substantial continuity with policies created by former President George Bush, increasing tension over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and growing uncertainty over Clinton 's willingness to pay for a US military force structure necessary to m eet American post-Cold War strategic requirements. Clinton benefited f rom the previous work of the Bush administration, which formulated the East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI), a careful, phased approach to r educing US forward-deployed military forces in Asia, in response to a declining threat from the former Soviet Union. In their early policy s tatements, Clinton administration officials reaffirmed the pace of EAS I force reductions. The Bottom-Up Review, a major review of overall US force levels issued in September 1993, affirmed Clinton's intention t o maintain US forward-deployed troop levels at about 100,000. Consider able anxiety, however, has resulted from early doctrinal and defense b udget disputes within the Clinton administration. Early initiatives to define a more limited role for the United States in world leadership and to limit US military capabilities to fight only one war at a time were reversed, in part due to the concerns of American allies in Asia. Yet, the declared intention, made by Clinton during his July visit to South Korea, to preserve a US capability to fight two wars has fallen into question over concern that his defense budget will not be able t o afford the forces proposed in the Bottom-Up Review. Estimates of a f ive-year cumulative budget shortfall for the Bottom-Up Review force ra nge from $100 billion to $35 billion. If Clinton does not increase his expenditures on defense, one result may be a further reduction of US military forces deployed in Asia. In Korea, Clinton's efforts in 1993 and early 1994 to craft a diplomatic solution to North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions have given way to sterner measures after an inspect ion of North Korean nuclear facilities in March 1994 revealed progress in building plutonium reprocessing facilities and a new larger nuclea r reactor. The confrontation with North Korea also highlighted the imp ortance of China and Japan in the event that political and economic sa nctions become necessary to compel North Korean compliance with nuclea r inspections. Clinton began military-to-military contacts with China that had been suspended by Bush and proposed to Japan that it cooperat e with the US in building Theater Missile Defense systems. In Southeas t Asia, Clinton undertook to improve defense relations with Malaysia a nd the Philippines. However, Clinton's efforts to improve military rel ations could become overshadowed by his efforts to politicize trade re lations with China and Japan. Clinton's proposal to increasingly manag e trade with Japan threatens to increase sympathy in Japan for proposa ls to create an Asian trade zone that could exclude the United States. Such an event would constitute a major setback for future US relation s with Asia.