This article examines the impact of a takeover bid on the careers and
compensation of chief executives of target firms. We find that acquisi
tion attempts occur more frequently in industries where chief executiv
e officers (CEO) have positive abnormal compensation. Target CEOs are
more likely to be replaced when a bid succeeds, than when it fails. CE
Os of target firms who lose their jobs generally fail to find another
senior executive position in any public corporation within three years
after the bid. Consistent with Fama's (1980) notion of ''ex post sett
ling up'', postbid compensation changes of managers retained after an
acquisition attempt are negatively related to several measures of thei
r prebid abnormal compensation. This result is robust to a variety of
specifications and does not seem to be caused by mean reversion or sel
ection bias. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a
takeover bid generates additional information that is used by labor ma
rkets to discipline managers.