IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AT-AND-T INVESTMENT GAME

Authors
FARRELL J SCOTCHMER S
Citation
J. Farrell et S. Scotchmer, IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AT-AND-T INVESTMENT GAME, Economics letters, 45(4), 1994, pp. 471-474
Citations number
2
Categorie Soggetti
Economics
Journal title
Economics letters → ACNP
ISSN journal
01651765
Volume
45
Issue
4
Year of publication
1994
Pages
471 - 474
Database
ISI
SICI code
0165-1765(1994)45:4<471:IBITAI>2.0.ZU;2-P
Abstract
We test for Nash equilibrium in the results of a nationwide investment game, and show that, at a very high confidence level, the hypothesis of Nash equilibrium can be rejected. Either players did not respond to the considerable incentives to win, or they failed to reach an equili brium.