ON PROPORTIONAL NONREPRESENTATION

The paper contends the main virtue conventionally attributed to propor tional electoral rules (i.e., effective representation of political vi ews). It discusses a number of shortcomings that lead too much proport ionality to a self-defeat: it reduces vote mobility through the strong cultivation of voters' loyalties; it smooths out vote variations when transforming them into seat variations; it reinforces intraparty ties to the detriment of vertical attention to constituents and it impinge s on the working of checks-and-balances. The paper does not aim at a s ystematic evaluation of the properties of various voting systems, nor is it the proportional principle as such that is under attack. However , its combination with other institutional features can entrap voters in their own choices, thus nurturing political collusion. It is becaus e of the ensuing lower influence of the voters on political decision-m aking that too much proportionality can lead to poor representation.