RESOLUTION OF EVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT - A GENERAL-THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS

While many cases in which conflict over the evolution of social behavi or exists even between closely related individuals (e.g., parent-offsp ring conflict) have been pointed out, little attention has been paid o n the problem of where such conflict should lead. A general theory of conflict resolution, however, has recently been developed. The key ide a of the theory is the incorporation of conflict costs in the inclusiv e fitness evaluation. The theory shows that if both sides engaged in t he conflict can potentially control the other at a cost, the coevoluti onary game of escalating the fight with increased conflict costs alway s leads either side to give in to the other, resolving the conflict. H ere we examine the logical basis of the theory in terms of a simplest example, donor-recipient conflict over the evolution of altruism, and to show its different types of application we review two more specific examples: reproductive-worker conflict over true (sterile) worker evo lution in termites and insider-outsider conflict over group size deter mination. The latter exemplifies the resolution of conflict over the v alue of a variable (group size in this case) rather than a behavior, s uggesting extended applicability of the basic theory.